Evoke plc, a gambling group that has incurred significant costs amid a favorable credit environment, is now in negotiations for a potential sale at approximately £0.50 per share. This follows years of declining investor confidence, increasing taxes, and mounting debt.
On April 20, Bally’s Intralot confirmed that it is in talks to make an offer for Evoke, which owns brands like William Hill, 888, and Mr Green. The deal, expected to involve mostly stock along with a partial cash option, values Evoke at just over £2 billion, debt included. This valuation is markedly lower than what the business used to command.
Evoke, previously known as 888 Holdings, has spent the last decade striving to establish itself as a leading gambling operator in Europe. It acquired William Hill’s non-US assets in 2022 for £1.95 billion, bringing additional debt to an already complex operation just as the online gambling market in Britain began to experience challenges. The combination of increased taxes, regulatory constraints, and inflation exacerbated the situation.
The downturn has become more pronounced in the last year. Evoke's recent full-year results indicated a modest revenue increase of just 2% to £1.78 billion in 2025, while post-tax losses expanded 149% to £541 million. Despite a 43% improvement in EBITDA to £301 million, net debt rose to £1.86 billion, indicating that operational advancements are being overshadowed by high leverage and financing costs.
This puts Evoke in a precarious position as it entertains an acquisition by Bally’s, a company that investors had previously viewed as a lesser player. Bally’s Interactive, the digital division of Rhode Island-based Bally’s Corporation, believes it has the potential to capitalize on Evoke’s situation.
“We see a compelling opportunity to bring our operating model to a significantly larger business,” stated Bally's Intralot CEO Robeson Reeves on April 20, emphasizing potential synergies and a chance to enhance Evoke's financial performance.
Many discussions surrounding this potential acquisition have portrayed Bally’s as an American player entering the UK market. However, the reality is that the company already has a considerable online presence in the UK, primarily through its acquisition of Gamesys in 2021.
“Most of the coverage is treating this as Bally’s walking into the UK from the US,” noted Ben Robinson, founder and managing partner of advisory firm Corfai. “They’re already here via Bally’s Intralot, arguably the number one UK iCasino and bingo operator through Gamesys. This is just a consolidation play, not an entry.”
Bally’s sees operational models from Gamesys – characterized by lower marketing intensity and improved margins – being effectively applied to parts of Evoke. During earnings calls, Reeves pointed out that Evoke’s UK online division and retail presence are key attractions of the deal.
Italy has emerged as a particular focus for Bally’s. Reeves referred to the Italian market as “appealing” due to its scale and growth potential, alongside Romania and Spain as regions where Bally’s currently lacks significant market presence.
This expansion is crucial for Bally’s as it becomes less reliant on the challenging UK market. While the online market in Britain has become increasingly burdensome, various European markets continue to present better growth opportunities with less taxing conditions. Evoke’s broad geographic reach, once viewed as disorganized, now appears strategically advantageous in this evolving landscape.
Bally's Intralot expressed optimism after reporting a 34.8% year-on-year increase in full-year 2025 revenue to €518 million, with adjusted EBITDA hitting €183.5 million and margins of 35.4%. Reeves indicated that pursuing inorganic growth remains a priority, supported by a €160 million undrawn revolving credit line and a flexible capital structure.
For Bally’s, acquiring Evoke provides an opportunity for immediate scaling across multiple regulated markets, something that is increasingly difficult to achieve organically in Europe. William Hill continues to be recognized as a leading betting brand in Britain, while Evoke's operations in Italy are still considered a growth driver, generating around £60 million in EBITDA annually according to Deutsche Bank analysts. The retail segment also generates cash despite its declining popularity.
Even those critical of Evoke's management concede that the business model itself retains potential. “It’s fundamentally a good business with a bad balance sheet,” commented a senior M&A adviser familiar with the situation. “The challenge lies more in the equity price and the need to manage the existing leverage.”
The crux of the current deliberation concerning the proposed acquisition revolves around the value of Evoke’s assets and whether they can yield adequate returns under the heightened regulatory and fiscal environment to warrant the associated debt.
Dr. Gabriele L. Stark-Lütke Schwienhorst, a senior associate at CMS, pointed out, “The Remote Gaming Duty increase is a legislative measure that cannot be reversed by operational improvements.” This insight underscores the reason behind Evoke's significantly decreased valuation. Once viewed as a high-growth segment of the digital sector capable of supporting high leverage, the UK market has lost that appeal. Tightening regulations have consistently squeezed profit margins while compliance costs have surged.
The pain has been particularly acute for enterprises like Evoke that carry substantial debt. The company's troubles extend beyond merely slowing growth; structural changes affecting the fundamentals of its capital structure have also taken place. The Remote Gaming Duty in the UK nearly doubled from 21% to 40% in April, with further increases anticipated, adding pressure on operators trying to maintain their profitability.
Evoke's management, led by CEO Per Widerström, has attempted to assure investors of a possible turnaround, stating the company remains focused on “delivering shareholder value” and that operational KPIs are improving despite broader economic challenges. However, investor skepticism persists, as many doubt that operational efficiencies could outweigh the underlying deterioration in the UK online gambling environment.
This situation may elucidate why private equity, once considered a potential rescuer for Evoke, seems to have stepped back. Initial discussions suggested that buyout firms might find Evoke's low valuation and global presence attractive. However, the practicalities proved challenging. “PE wasn’t priced out,” remarked Robinson. “The structure stopped working.”
Bally’s, on the other hand, is believed to have certain advantages that financial sponsors lack. It will pay mainly in shares and already maintains a significant iCasino presence in the UK through Gamesys, which allows for immediate operational synergies. In contrast, private equity firms would be burdened with acquiring roughly £1.8 billion of Evoke's debt without having operational synergies to mitigate their investment risk.
Dr. Stark-Lütke Schwienhorst noted that the regulatory demands further constrict the pool of potential bidders. “The complexity of obtaining licensing approval across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously materially narrows the field of credible bidders,” she stated, adding that bidders lacking a strong established presence in regulated European markets might be deterred by the high costs associated with acquiring a highly leveraged group.
Paradoxically, what once was seen as Evoke's strength, its multinational diversification, may now limit the pool of interested buyers.
Despite this, there remains a significant level of skepticism surrounding Bally’s intentions. Analyst Alun Bowden highlighted considerable execution risks, noting on a recent podcast that integrating Evoke's operations with Bally’s could result in massive combined debt, potentially around €3.5 billion. He stressed the burden this poses, especially within an increasingly challenging economic landscape affected by rising taxes and broader uncertainty in the UK.
Bowden also raised concerns regarding product offerings, considering William Hill's core identity is in sports betting, while Bally’s strongholds lie in casino and bingo. “Where is the product, the platform, the leadership to enhance that business?” he queried, suggesting that such a merger necessitates flawless execution involving many intricate elements.
Integration concerns remain daunting as well. Robinson warned that merging different technology platforms poses significant challenges, often leading to customer disruptions and shedding market shares. Regulatory pressures meanwhile seem unlikely to lessen, with UK reforms boosting compliance demands while constraining profitability. Evoke's confirmation of plans to shutter around 200 William Hill betting shops serves as stark evidence of the difficulties plaguing Britain’s retail betting industry.
Robinson added, “What’s being undervalued is the net debt exceeding £3 billion, the scrutiny from the CMA on UK online concentration, and the reality of Evoke shareholders receiving stock in a Greek-listed company instead of cash.”
Prospects for alternative solutions also appear bleak. A senior adviser speculated that Morgan Stanley, which represents Evoke, has likely explored potential buyers but noted the surprising absence of interest from private equity firms.
Even if Bally’s moves forward with a complete acquisition of Evoke, some parts of the business might later be divested to trim down debt levels. Robinson cited Italy and Mr. Green as key contenders for potential sales. “The more straightforward private equity approach is to divest after acquisition,” he noted, as Bally’s Intralot aims to navigate down from over £3 billion in net debt.
Nevertheless, numerous industry insiders believe that separating assets for sale prior to acquisition presents substantial hurdles. “They already tried to sell Italy, but offers were insufficient to alleviate the debt burden to support a streamlined operation,” remarked a senior sector advisor. “It appears to be a whole-company deal, in my view.”
Dr. Stark-Lütke Schwienhorst supported this perspective, emphasizing that a complete acquisition could offer the advantage of a single, consolidated licensing process, while assets sold separately would need individual authorizations, increasing risks and uncertainties surrounding execution.
Currently, Evoke's enterprise value rests around £2 billion, a figure that would have once seemed extraordinarily low for the holding company of William Hill. However, a senior sector advisor indicated that this valuation is not far under the market averages for similar enterprises facing high tax rates.
This situation underscores the profound shifts occurring within the European gambling sector. Investors, who previously prioritized rapid growth, are now more concerned about stability—lower debt, enhanced profitability, and resilience against regulatory changes.
Ironically, Evoke appears to be enduring the consequences of the same consolidation strategy that was once instrumental in its growth, as one senior advisor observed. The prior acquisition of William Hill’s international operations was marketed as a transformative move that would yield scale and synergies. Instead, it ultimately left the firm heavily indebted just as the market turned against operators heavily reliant on debt.
With another consolidator now aiming to succeed where the last faltered, one thing is becoming clear: in the European gambling landscape, mere size no longer guarantees success.
