For years, the conversation surrounding gambling regulation has followed a predictable pattern. Industry operators often voice their frustrations, claiming that politicians legislate for publicity rather than substance, while regulators push back, arguing that the industry resists necessary oversight. Public health experts contend that the drive for profit can undermine efforts to protect players.
In the Czech Republic, a novel approach is unfolding in Prague, aiming to shift this dynamic. Recent estimates indicate that illegal gambling is costing the country around $15.9 million in tax revenue, with players losing an estimated CZK14.5 billion annually to unlicensed operators.
The Institute for Gambling Regulation (IPRH) serves as a representative body for approximately 95% of the regulated gambling market in the Czech Republic. However, its director, Jan Řehola, emphasizes that it should not merely be viewed as a lobbying group. Instead, IPRH aims to create a lasting platform that unites operators, addiction specialists, behavioral economists, regulators, and government officials to craft evidence-based policy.
The success of this collaborative approach remains to be seen, but it reflects a notable shift in European gambling regulation. There is growing recognition that neither governments nor operators have sufficient information on their own to effectively tackle complex issues such as illegal gambling, online risks, and cross-border player behavior.
The institute's flagship initiative, known as IRIS, embodies this collaborative philosophy.
Gambling in the modern online environment rarely involves players sticking to a single operator. Instead, they maintain multiple accounts, shift between platforms, and respond to various promotions. Operators only see fragments of player activity.
"At the core of IRIS is a simple idea," Řehola says. "We look at gambling from the perspective of the player, not the operator."
An individual player’s behavior might seem innocuous when viewed by one operator but could indicate emerging harm when their activities across multiple operators are considered. "It makes no sense for one operator to warn a player while another rewards him with a bonus," Řehola explains.
IRIS addresses this collective-action issue without establishing a central database holding personal gambling histories, a common concern among critics. Instead, the system uses pseudonymised identifiers created by the Czech state licensing infrastructure. Operators do not share customer names or account information. Instead, the platform analyzes behavioral data across participating operators, categorizing risk with a common methodology and sharing only the risk category with each operator simultaneously.
Whether this structure proves effective is yet to be determined. Řehola acknowledges the system's limitations, stating, "I would not present IRIS as a magic solution that works in 100% of cases. Nothing in prevention or addiction risk reduction works like that." He highlights that the system continuously assesses player risk scores, allowing for observation of trends over time and the impact of specific interventions on behavior.
Success, he asserts, will not be gauged simply by the number of messages sent to players. "Success means measurable changes in players’ behavior: lower risk scores over time, reduced escalation, better utilization of limits, and fewer players entering high-risk categories."
He is also aware of the potential downside: if a message or timing fails to change behavior, the model must adapt. "One of the biggest advantages of IRIS is that interventions can be evaluated almost in real time."
This model inevitably raises the question of whether gambling operators are truly ready to prioritize responsible gambling over their revenue. Most high-intensity players generate substantial income for operators. Why should there be confidence that commercial incentives align with player protection?
Řehola understands the skepticism. "It would not be credible to pretend that commercial incentives suddenly disappear because we talk about responsibility."
When individual operators act separately, responsible gambling efforts can backfire. An operator may cut bonuses and prompt player interventions, only for the player to switch to a competitor offering fewer restrictions. "In that situation, the responsible operator may lose revenue without actually reducing harm."
IRIS, however, seeks to alter that equation. With all major operators following the same framework, responsible behavior becomes a market standard rather than a competitive disadvantage.
There's a longer-term business rationale, too. "Revenue from players losing control is not sustainable revenue. It carries regulatory risk, reputational risk, and political pressure for stricter regulation. Retaining players in a sustainable manner is likely more valuable than short-term gains that erode trust."
The sustainability of this logic under ongoing financial pressure remains untested.
Another concern involves player displacement. If players evade IRIS interventions and transition to offshore or cryptocurrency casinos, has the system merely relocated the problem? "There is a real risk," Řehola acknowledges. "If a responsible gambling tool in the legal market merely shifts vulnerable players to riskier options, it has not solved the issue."
He emphasizes that IRIS must operate in concert with efforts to combat illegal gambling. In the Czech Republic, over 240,000 individuals are registered in the Register of Excluded Persons, but many still engage with the black market. "People do not stop gambling simply because the state writes their name on a list," he states. IPRH is collaborating with the Ministry of Finance and the Customs Administration on a national taskforce against illegal gambling, positing that protection within regulated markets and enforcement against illegal ones must work in tandem.
Moreover, IRIS is structured as a system of proportional intervention rather than punishment. Its goal is to diminish harmful stimuli, like aggressive bonuses and targeted marketing, primarily for high-risk players, allowing average players to participate without disruption. "The aim is to help the player return to a more sustainable level of play within the regulated environment."
Determining what constitutes risky gambling poses a challenge for the algorithm. Behavior that may be troubling to a psychologist could simply indicate a comfortable player spending within their means. How does IRIS differentiate between atypical gambling and problematic patterns?
Řehola is candid about this limitation. "This question touches one of the biggest limits of any system like IRIS. There is no objective truth to label someone as addicted."
He asserts that IRIS should not be a black box making final judgments. "It does not diagnose a player, nor should it infringe on their legal rights. It signals risk, which then prompts proportional interventions such as reality checks, safer gambling communications, or information about voluntary support."
Additionally, IRIS doesn’t merely assess whether someone is gambling a lot. A wealthy player may spend more and remain in control, while another player might gamble less but exhibit signs of escalation, such as chasing losses or ignoring limits. The methodology incorporates academic research, international harm markers, operator data, and expert contributions from addiction specialists and behavioral economists.
Řehola acknowledges that achieving perfection is unrealistic. "If it flags too many atypical players as high-risk, we must adjust it. Conversely, if it fails to identify players who later show clear signs of harm, we must also recalibrate. The credibility of the system relies on honesty about its own limitations."
The legal framework supporting IRIS is notable. Instead of developing technology and seeking legal endorsement afterward, IPRH took the reverse approach. Legislative changes enacted on October 1, 2025, enable licensed Czech gambling operators to exchange pseudonymized data for player protection, under strict conditions.
"The data cannot be used for marketing, commercial profiling, or competitive intelligence. It serves solely the purpose of responsible gambling and player protection," Řehola points out. This legislation passed through parliament without opposition, an unusual achievement in the often contentious realm of gambling policy.
This initiative marks a distinct regulatory dialogue. Most gambling regulations hover between two ineffective instincts. One presumes that commercial interests thwart genuine self-regulation while the other believes increasingly restrictive laws can alone mitigate problems exacerbated by evolving digital markets.
The Czech approach challenges both views, asserting that effective regulation requires comprehensive information, and that knowledge is dispersed among various stakeholders, including governments, operators, medical professionals, and researchers. No single entity can claim full authority over the matter.
Řehola describes the approach as "smart regulation versus symbolic regulation." He refrains from overstating the model's exportability—every jurisdiction has a unique legal and market context—but believes in the universal applicability of its core principles: collaboration across the legal market, public authorities, and independent experts, a focus on data, and a commitment to measurable results.
The long-term effectiveness of IRIS in reducing gambling-related harm is still uncertain, and Řehola is the first to admit this. The model must adapt if the data does not support its efficacy, which may ultimately represent its most credible feature.
