Intouch Games was penalized by the UK Gambling Commission for a third time in four years. This will increase the amount of the penalty to more than PS10m.
The latest penalty package for social responsibility and money laundering failures will see the gambling industry pay PS6.1m. This brings its total to PS11.7m.
This comes after a PS2.2m settlement was paid in 2019 for regulatory failings. There is also a PS3.4m warning and action in 2021 following a UKGC assessment that revealed social responsibility, money laundering, and marketing failures.
Intouch Games operates 11 websites, including Bonus Boss and Cashmo. Intouch Games also has Slot Factory. The regulator found that Intouch Games failed to pass a compliance assessment in March 2022.
Intouch Games’ UKGC latest regulatory action is the latest this year. This follows TonyBet getting penalized PS442,750, and Vivaro trading as VBet. Intouch Games made payments in lieu of a PS337.631 penalty package.
Kay Roberts commented that “considering this operator’s past of failings, we expected to see substantial improvement when we performed our planned compliance assessment. Despite many improvements, there were still some work to be done.
“This PS6.1m fine is a clear indication that we will escalate enforcement actions when failures are repeated, and all licensees need to be acutely aware.”
This latest social responsibility error includes not speaking to a customer for seven weeks after being flagged for interaction due to erratic play patterns or extended periods of play.
It was also claimed that the group accepted the word of a customer that they earned PS6,000 per month, without verifying the information. This was after the customer account was flagged for customer spend and gambling at unsociable hours.
AML insufficiencies also include not having policies and procedures in place to address risks factors and inadequacy in considering the Commission’s money laundering or terrorist financing risk assessment guidance.
Intouch Games was also cited by the regulator as having not implemented its policies, procedures, and controls effectively. One example was the failure to follow its own policy regarding requesting source of funds information from customers that had lost or deposited PS10,000 within a 12-month period.
A final AML problem was “not adequately taking into account the risk that a customer is a beneficiary of life insurance policies; having connections to high-risk countries; or being politically exposed, a family member of PEPs, or close associates of PEPs, within its money laundering or terrorist financing risk assessment.”
